We reconsider the Cournot duopoly problem in light of the theory for long memory. We introduce the Caputo fractional-order difference calculus to classical duopoly theory to propose a fractional-order discrete Cournot duopoly game model, which allows participants to make decisions while making full use of their historical information. Then we discuss Nash equilibria and local stability by using linear approximation.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper are twofold. One purpose is to bring together two independent lines of research in applied mathematics and industrial economics: fractional-order difference equations and Cournot equilibria. The other is to introduce long memory to classical Cournot duopoly games by replacing integer-order difference equations with fractional-order forms.
Links between difference equation and Cournot equilibria in the literature
Cournot game theory [1] was proposed in 1838. Many researchers, such as Nash [2] , Von Neumann, and Morgenstern [3] , have since made landmark contributions to the development of game theory, which has become a powerful analytic tool in fields outside economics, such as cyberspace security [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , power systems [9, 10] , cytobiology [11] , image processing [12] , human-machine systems [13] , artificial intelligence [14, 15] , safety engineering [16, 17] , nuclear security [18] , oncology [19] , system control [20] , and information science [21] . Considering the powerful dynamic characterization ability of difference equations, the discrete dynamical game with integer-order difference equations has become an important research direction in industrial economics field. Using integer-order difference equations, economics researchers have developed various interesting discrete Cournot duopoly game models, as shown in Table1.
Links between fractional-order difference equations and scientific models in the literature
Díaz and Osler [49] first presented the theory of fractional-order differences in 1974. Miller and Ross [50] and Gray and Zhang [51] developed fractional-order difference calculus in 1988. Fractional-order difference calculus has attracted the interest of many scholars and practitioners, but it is still a young research field compared to fractional differential calculus, which has developed for more than 300 years. Researchers of the former include Atici, Eloe, and Ş engül [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] ; Bastos, Ferreira and Torres [57] ; Wu, Baleanu et al. [58, 59] ; Goodrich [60, 61] ; Abdeljawad et al. [62] [63] [64] [65] ; Wei and Wang et al. [67, 68] ;Čermák, Győri, and Nechvátal [69] ; Mozyrska and Wyrwas [70, 71] ; and Abu-Saris and Al-Mdallal [72] . Fractional-order difference calculus is applied in many scientific fields, as shown in Table 2 .
Links between fractional-order difference equations and Cournot duopoly game
The theory of integer-order difference equation is not suitable to analyze the nonlinear dynamic characteristics of the fractional discrete Cournot duopoly game with long memory. We must employ new theories to analyze the stability, bifurcation, and chaos of the fractional discrete game. Fortunately, researchers have produced some useful results for analyzing the stability of fractional-order difference equations, such as explicit stability conditions [69] , explicit criteria for stability [70] , stability by linear approximation [71, 94] , asymptotic stability criteria [72] , Lyapunov functions [95] , finite-time stability [96] , and chaos analysis [97] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in section 2. In section 3, a long-memory discrete Cournot duopoly game with Caputo fractional-order difference equations is presented. The Nash equilibrium points and their local stabilities are studied in section 4. In section 5, bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and 0-1 test algorithms are employed to validate the main results. This paper concludes with a summary in section 6.
Preliminaries
The following definitions of fractional-order difference calculus are introduced. Definition 1 (See [52] .) For any real numbers ν, t ∈ R, the ν rising fractional factorial of t is defined as
Definition 2 (See [51, 52] .) Let x : N a → R, a ∈ R, t ∈ N a+ν , and ν > 0. Then the fractional sum of order ν is defined as
where a is the start point, N a = {a, a + 1, a + 2, . . .} denotes the isolated time scale, and σ(s) = s + 1.
Definition 3 (See [63] .) Let ν > 0, ν N, t ∈ N a+n−ν , and n = [ν] + 1. Then the ν-order Caputo-like left delta difference is defined by
Theorem 1 (See [99] .) For the Caputo fractional-order difference system
2) the equivalent discrete integral system is written as
where the initial iteration is
Using Definition 1, we can get
.
So, we can obtain the following proposition.
Remark 1 If a = 0, we rewrite system (2.2) in the following numerical form
According to the linearization theorem [94] , we obtain the following theorem, which is a special case of refs. [69, 71] .
Theorem 2 Assume that system (2.4) is nonlinear with v ∈ (0, 1), x(t) = (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), · · · , x n (t)) T , and f (t) = ( f 1 (t), f 2 (t), · · · , f n (t)) T is continuously differentiable at a fixed point x eq . Then ∀t ∈ N a+1−ν , system (2.4) is locally asymptotically stable when all eigenvalues λ of the following Jacobian matrix
Considering a two-dimensional case of system (2.4), we obtain the following theorem, which is a special case of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (See [69] .) Two-dimensional system (2.4) is locally asymptotically stable if det J > 0 and either In the following discussion, the time-dependence, subscripts, and superscripts will be omitted from notation if no confusion is caused.
Model
Let us consider a classical Cournot competition between firms 1 and 2, who produce homogeneous products which are perfect substitutes. Let q i (t), i = 1, 2 denote the i−th firm's output during discrete time periods t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . For simplicity, as mentioned by Bischi & Naimzada [25] and Agiza & Elsadany [28, 29] , we assume the market-clearing price p(t) at period t, an inverse demand function, is linear and decreasing, as follows:
where b and d are positive constants.
The cost function takes the following form:
where c i , i = 1, 2, is a positive constant.
The i−th firm's profit can be written as
Then the i−th firm's marginal profit can be obtained by differentiating with respect to q i :
Now, let us consider the following repeated game mechanism. These two bounded rational firms have long memories of output decisions. Firms try to employ more complex adjustment mechanisms, which can be called "bounded rationality with long memory." The dynamical adjustment mechanism is based on the long memory effect and the local estimation of the marginal profit, which can be described by
where α i > 0 is the speed of adjustment, and C ∆ ν a is the ν-order left Caputo-like delta difference. For the function q(t), the delta difference operator ∆ is defined by ∆q(t) = q(t + 1) − q(t).
Remark 2 When ν = 1 and ∆ ν a q i (t) = q i (t + 1) − q i (t), then equation (3.11) degenerates to
which agrees with the game model without long-memory effects proposed by Bischi & Naimzada [25] and
Agiza & Elsadany [28, 29] .
From the above assumptions, we obtain the following discrete fractional Cournot duopoly game:
(3.13)
Nash equilibrium and local stability
The equilibrium points of system (3.13) satisfy
(4.14)
By simple algebraic computation, we obtain four Nash equilibrium points: Obviously, equilibrium points E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 are bounded equilibria [25] . So, we only analyze the stability of non-bounded equilibrium point E 4 , as follows.
Theorem 4 System (3.13) is locally asymptotically stable at Nash equilibrium point E 4 if
15)
Proof. The Jacobian matrix J of system (3.13) evaluated at Nash equilibrium points E 4 is
where trJ and det J are the same as (4.16) and (4.17), respectively.
We algebraically obtain det J > 0, trJ < 0, (trJ) 2 − 4 det J > 0, and
So, we can use Theorem 2 to find that system (3.13) is locally asymptotically stable at Nash equilibrium point E 4 if eq. This completes the proof. 
Numerical simulation
According to Remark 1, system (5.18) can be rewritten as
We will use eqs. To analyze bifurcation and chaos of the long-memory system (3.13) with fractional-order ν, we vary the long-memory parameter, fractional-order ν ∈ (0, 1), and fix the remaining parameters as α1 = 0.45, The criterion of the 0-1 chaos test [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] shows that bounded trajectories in the (p, s)−plane or K ≈ 0 mean system (3.13) is regular, and Brownian-like trajectories in the (p, s)−plane or K ≈ 1 indicate system (3.13) is chaotic. So, system (3.13) is chaotic when ν < 0.4, i.e., when K ≈ 1. Obviously, system (3.13) shows that the bifurcation diagram quite well coincides with the scatter diagram of K.
For Figure 2 , let ν = 0.2, which leads to K = 0.9752. We can know that system (3.13) is chaotic, as shown in Figure 3 . To produce Figure 3 , we iterate it 3,500 times and draw a duopoly output time series using the first 300 data points, as shown in Figure 3 (a)-(b). We also create its phase portrait (as shown in Figure 3 (c)) and calculate its median correlation coefficient using the last 3,000 data points after dropping 500 transient data points, and draw its trajectories in new coordinates (p, s), as shown in Figure 3 
Conclusion
We have proposed a nonlinear fractional-order discrete Cournot duopoly game model that shows the longmemory effect. We discussed its Nash equilibria and local stability by linear approximation, then numerically illustrated its phase portraits, bifurcation diagrams, and chaos attractors using 
